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This is a study in which emotional intelligence (EI) as well as several other 
personality dimensions were studied in a real, high-stakes, selection 
situation, N=190. Forty-one trait oriented personality scales were measured 
and factor analyzed. A factor pattern with four secondary factors was found: 
EI, emotional stability, rigidity/perfectionism and energy/dominance. These 
factors were related to standard FFM (Five Factor Model) dimensions, to 
Hogan's Development Survey ("the dark side of personality") and to a number 
of tasks measuring skills in identifying emotions and emotion knowledge. It 
was found that EI and emotional stability correlated significantly with some of 
the latter measures, more so than the FFM scales. Impression management 
was measured with several scales. In the end of the testing session, 
participants were instructed explicitly to fake their answers. These active 
faking responses showed consistency across personality dimensions and 
also correlated strongly with impression management scores. Correcting the 
final pooled score (the four secondary factors combined) for impression 
management and faking produced fairly strong changes in the "short list" of 
participants ranking among the top 30, or 60. It is concluded that personality 
trait EI shows some promise while emotion identification tasks must probably 
be geared towards human emotion rather than abstract judgment of emotion 
as expressed in art or music. 
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Emotional intelligence (EI)
2 is a concept currently in focus among the general public, 
practitioners and researchers. It is widely believed by the public that emotional and social 
competence are as important, or even more important, than traditional dimensions of 
intellectual ability and personality, and Goleman (Goleman, 1995, 1998) and others, e.g. 
Bar-On (Bar-On, 1997), have made some very strong claims to that effect. It is often 
pointed out that traditional IQ involves many prediction errors with regard to real-life 
important criteria. Yet, the fact that much remains to be accounted for in various criterion 
dimensions beyond what is typically achieved with traditional IQ type predictors does not 
necessarily imply that EI is the missing factor. Sternberg has made a good case for his 
concept of practical intelligence which is cognitively oriented (Sternberg et al., 2000). 
Besides, actual measurement of EI has so far been rather elusive; see Davis et al. (Davies, 
Stankov, & Roberts, 1998) and Sjöberg (Sjöberg, 2001b) for reviews.  
 
There are basically two approaches to the measurement of EI: as a mental ability or as a 
personality trait. Mayer, Salovey and Caruso were instrumental in initiating current interest 
in the concept by their work in the beginning of the 1990's (Mayer, DiPaolo, & Salovey, 
1990; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). They devised tasks in which people were instructed to 
judge, among other things, the emotional content expressed in art or music. The most 
common way of scoring such responses is consensual scoring in which people are 
awarded points for making the modal response given by a norm group. There is currently 
an extensive testing procedure available for assessing EI according to this approach but 
little is known about its convergent and discriminative validity (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 
2000; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000).  
 
EI as a personality trait is measured by personality test items of a fairly traditional kind, and 
is close to many other questionnaire methods for measuring various traits. The best-known 
example has been devised by Bar-On (Bar-On, 2000; Bar-On, Brown, Kirkcaldy, & Thomé, 
2000), but little research has been published on that test. Its validity is likewise not 
extensively documented in published articles, although the test distributors do list a number 
of internal technical reports. It is noteworthy that the personality trait approach has so far 
rarely been related to the main-stream Five Factor Model (FFM) of personality (McCrae & 
Costa, 1987; Wiggins & Trapnell, 1997). It is important, of course, to establish empirically 
whether EI really contributes any information not readily available in standard FFM tests. 
Sjöberg (Sjöberg, 2001b) found some support for the notion that trait EI does make such a 
contribution.  
 
The two approaches have, thus, only been little investigated so far and they have rarely 
been related to each other on data from the same respondents. In addition, response styles 
such as social desirability and acquiescence (Paulhus, 1991) have been little investigated 
in relation to EI tests. The sensitivity of EI measures to response bias is a pressing issue 






The purpose of the present paper was to investigate whether 
 
·  an EI dimension can be isolated from other, standard, personality dimensions and 
whether it is related to gender (women expected to be superior) but not to age 
 
·  if trait EI is related to emotion identification skills and contributes to explaining such 
skills beyond the standard FFM dimensions 
·  if EI can be measured in a highly competitive selection situation without being unduly 
influenced by impression management tendencies; alternatively if such tendencies 
can be controlled for. 
 
The present study is partly a replication and partly an extension of a previous investigation 
using similar conceptualizations (Sjöberg, 2001b). The set of personality scales was 
considerably extended and so was the measurement of impression management and 
faking. The criterion tasks of identifying emotions were also improved, as described in the 




Participants and test situation. The Board of the SSE (Stockholm School of Economics) 
had decided to create 30 extra openings for students starting in the fall of 2000 and to base 
selection to those slots on non-intellectual dimensions such as EI. A similar procedure had 
been used in 1999. It should be noted that the SSE is a very prestigious elite school. It is 
very difficult to gain admission as a student and such admission is extremely desirable for 
many applicants.  
 
The author was commissioned to further develop the tests to be used for selection. From 
applicants not admitted in the regular procedure, the School invited 400 applicants (out of a 
total of appr. 4,000) closest to the cut-off in terms of the qualifications they had documented 
in their applications (high school grades or intellectual ability test scores). Hence, the 
invitees were quite a select group intellectually, just slightly below those who had been 
admitted. Twenty-one of those who turned up for testing had taken similar tests one year 
before. 
 
One hundred and ninety of the 400 invited applicants took the tests. They were informed in 
the invitation letter that the tests were not about intelligence or knowledge, but about 
personality and emotional and social skills important for vocational success. They had also 
been informed that the tests were to be taken in a group, that the SSE would only be 
informed about their final score and rank order, and that all individual information beyond 
that was confidential. They were encouraged to answer all questions truthfully and fully, and 
those who wished also got written notification of their results about 10 days after the test 
was completed. Any other questions about details of testing and scoring (many called 
before testing to find out about the test) were not answered. The testees were also 
informed that 60 of them would be invited to come to an interview the following week (on 
the basis of test results) and that the final recommendation would be based on both  
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interview and test results. They were instructed to bring with them a short essay on the 
topic "Why I want to become an economist". 
On the whole, the participants appeared to be highly motivated for the test. Their mean age 
was 20.5 years (range 18-34), 88 (46%)  were female and 102 male.  
 
Test development. The total test battery took about 6 hours of testing time, i.e. a full day of 
testing. The description of it will be divided, for the purposes of the present paper, in two 
sections: tests proper and criteria. The present section deals with the tests, the subsequent 
one with the criteria.  
 
The tests described here were designed and selected so as to measure EI and some 
related dimensions. Not all can be counted as EI dimensions proper, but they were of both 
practical and theoretical interest in the present context and they provided a context for the 
attempt to isolate the EI dimension.  
 
Measurement of emotional intelligence. Some items were translated from the literature, 
among them the EI scale proposed by Schutte et al. (Schutte et al., 1998). Reliabilities 
were estimated by means of Cronbach's alfa (Cronbach, 1951). The Schutte et al. scale 
(present alfa=0.86
3) measures alexithymia (ability to identify and describe feelings, as well 
as a tendency to shun away from emotional dimensions in thought and social relations), 
attention to feelings, clarity of feelings, mood repair, optimism and impulse control. The 
alexithymia scale of Bagby, Parker & Taylor (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994) was also 
employed (present alfa=0.81). The empathy (Hogan, 1969) scale of Mehrabian and Epstein 
(Mehrabian & Epstein, 1970) was also used (present alfa=0.80), as well as the Jones and 
Crandall scale of self actualization (Jones & Crandall, 1986) (present alfa=0.67). Roger and 
Najarian (Roger & Najarian, 1989) described a set of items measuring four aspects of 
emotion control: rehearsal (14 items, alfa=0.75), emotional inhibition (14 items, alfa=0.79), 
benign control (13 items, alfa=0.51) and aggression control
4 (13 items, alfa=0.70), all 
included here although one of the scales had a low present alfa value. Nineteen of the 
items of the Christie scale of Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970), and 11 additional 
items written for the present study, were used (present alfa including the new items=0.81). 
This scale measures a cynical and manipulative attitude and should be negatively related to 
EI (Bar-On & Parker, 2000).  
 
Other personality dimensions. Several scales developed in our unit were used: mental 
energy and work motivation (Sjöberg & Lind, 1994), 19 items with an alfa=0.67, creativity 
(25 items and alfa=0.74), compulsive tendency (sub-clinical), 27 items and alfa=0.77, 
perfectionism, 8 items and alfa=0.71, and procrastination, 28 items and alfa=0.86. A scale 
called Enigma measures lack of understanding of oneself or other people, 7 items and 
alfa=0.69. From an extensive item pool included in the questionnaire four more scales were 
constructed: dominance (11 items, alfa=0.82), emotional instability (16 items, alfa=0.82), 
introversion and social indifference (18 items, alfa=0.81) and inhibition and lack of 
spontaneousness (13 items, alfa=0.74).  
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Using items of the type used in locus of control scales (Rotter, 1966), three indices were 
constructed: external control and fatalism (11 items, alfa=0.50), competence or internal 
control (10 items, alfa=0.62) and control by luck/unluck (8 items, alfa=0.55). Other ways of 
conceptualizing such items are available (Collins, 1974), but there is a consensus on a 
need for a multidimensional description (West & Finch, 1997). The regular Rotter scale 
items (Rotter, 1966) yielded two factors: one measuring control (10 items, alfa=0.75) and 
one lack of control (8 items, alfa=0.69). The two factor scores were moderately strongly 
correlated, -0.51, p<0.01.  
 
Cognitive functioning. Several scales which measured various aspects of cognitive 
functioning were also included. Emotion and cognition interact, and skills in handling 
emotions may correlate with cognitive skills and strategies at various levels. Besides, it was 
considered to be potentially useful to include scales that could provide a context from which 
"pure" EI and emotion skills may be isolated. Broadbent's CFQ (cognitive failures 
questionnaire) scale (Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Parkes, 1982) was therefore used; 
this is a scale that purports to measure susceptibility to stress and mental health (present 
alfa=0.90). Koopman et al. (Koopman, Sanderman, Timmerman, & Emmelkamp, 1994) 
have devised a scale for measuring irrational beliefs. It has 50 items, 48 of which were 
used here and were scored in five subscales: worrying (11 items, alfa=0.66), rigidity (11 
items, alfa=0.58), problem avoidance (9 items, alfa=0.65), demand for approval (7 items, 
alfa=0.66), and emotional irresponsibility (7 items, alfa=0.65). Decision making styles and 
attitudes were studied with the use of items reported by Mann et al. (Mann, Burnett, 
Radford, & Ford, 1997). Factor analysis of this set of items gave three factors: decision 
stress (alfa=0.78, 7 items), decision perfectionism (alfa=0.71, 5 items) and decision 
avoidance (alfa=0.73, 6 items). Epstein et al. (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996) 
devised scales for measuring intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking styles 
(need for cognition, 19 items, alfa=0.80; and faith in intuition, 10 items, alfa=0.74) and they 
were also used here.  
 
Four additional scales were split randomly in two halves in order to study active faking. The 
first half of the items was inserted in the regular questionnaire (at random places), and the 
second half was presented at the very end of the questionnaire, following the instruction to 
fake the answers so as to maximize the chance to be admitted. Purely tactical answers 
were thus called for in the faking section.  
 
The first halves of these scales were psychometrically well behaved and gave acceptable 
alfa values: general self esteem (Schwarzer, 1993) (5 items, alfa=0.68), sensation seeking 
(Zuckerman, 1994) (16 items, alfa=0.72), manifest anxiety (Taylor, 1953) (13 items, 
alfa=0.83) and impulsive decision making (Claes, Vertommen, & Braspenning, 2000) (12 
items, alfa=0.70). The properties of the faked responses will be reported in a later section. 
It should be noted here that the non-faked responses will be used in the initial factor 
analysis of all the indices.  
 
In addition, several experimental items were included in the questionnaire, to be used in 
further test construction work. They are not described here but were of the same general  
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nature as the items described. The total number of questionnaire items was 1109. They 
were presented in random order. They were judged on a four-point response scale with the 
categories "agree absolutely", "agree to some extent", "disagree to some extent" and 
"disagree absolutely". 
 
The indices used for isolating an EI dimension numbered 41 in the present study which was 
thus much broader than the previous one which used 21 indices.  
 
Criteria. In order to assess the construct validity of EI and other second-order factors 
expected from the analysis of personality scales, a number of criterion variables were 
included in the design. Some of them were measures of emotional skills, broadly speaking, 
others were standard and well-known personality tests. 
 
The first criterion dimension used was that of knowledge about other people's current and 
habitual mood, here termed emotion knowledge. This is a measure not included in the 
MEIS (Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale) scale devised by Mayer, Salovey and 
Caruso (Mayer, Salovey et al., 2000) who studied other aspects of knowledge about 
emotions. To measure it, we used a mood scale consisting of 71 items, measuring six 
factors (Sjöberg, Svensson, & Persson, 1979). The six factors were happiness, tension, 
fatigue, confidence, extraversion and social orientation. The participants were instructed to 
rate their own current mood at the start of the test session, and then their habitual mood. 
After that, they were asked to rate the current and habitual mood of the other testees. The 
mean ratings of current and habitual mood were used as criteria. Factor scores were 
computed and the absolute differences between actual means of current and habitual 
mood on the one hand, beliefs about these dimensions on the other, were computed for 
each participant and each factor. The alfas (computed across the six factors) were 0.78 and 
0.84 for current and habitual mood, respectively. They were strongly correlated, r=0.52.  
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The intercorrelations among the scores in the six factors are given in Table 1 for current 
and habitual mood
5.  
                                  
  
 







































































































* p<0.05, ** p<0.01,  
 
These data support the existence of an ability to correctly estimate how other people feel, 
and it will be used as a criterion to assess our tests of emotional intelligence. The results 
are very similar to those reported in Sjöberg (Sjöberg, 2001b).  
 
In a second phase of the test session, participants made ratings of music, art, social 
interaction episodes described in the questionnaires and facial expressions. These tasks 
were all designed to measure ability to identify emotions, this being the major aspect of EI 
according to Ciarrochi et al. (Ciarrochi, Chan, & Caputi, 2000), and also the one most easy 
to measure. The "correct" answer in each case was the most common one given in the 
present group. This approach to scoring is commonly used in EI work, see e. g. Davies, 
Stankov and Roberts (Davies et al., 1998). In a few cases two response alternatives were 
equally often chosen, and most popular, and then they were both used as definitions of 
correctness.  
 
The 20 music excerpts came from many different types of music, from classical to hard 
rock. The art samples were 20 slides of computer generated fractal art. The music and art 
samples were all judged on five category bipolar scales, measuring: 
 
z positive experience vs negative experience 
z interesting vs uninteresting 
z happy vs sad 
z warm vs cold 
z relaxed vs tense  
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z friendly vs aggressive 
z admiring vs contemptuous 
z reassuring vs frightening 
z easy to understand vs hard to understand 
 
Participants were instructed to rate the emotion expressed in the music or art samples, not 
how they themselves felt. Only the last seven of these scales were used in scoring emotion 
identification. (How they felt was reflected in the first two scales which were not scored). 
Each music or art sample was available for judgment for about one minute. 
 
Twenty social episodes, each involving two key actors, were then described. The 
participants were asked to rate, on unipolar three category scales, to what extent each of 












All of the nine scales were used in scoring. In the final part of the section on emotion 
identification, 12 pictures from the Lightfoot series of facial expressions (Engen, Levy, & 











The alfa values were low for music, 0.43, but satisfactory for art, episodes and facial 
expressions: 0.69, 0.80 and 0.69, respectively. As compared to the previous testing 
(Sjöberg, 2001b), the art section was now much more homogenous, all pictures being 
computer generated fractal art. Reliability was increased. In addition, the number of social 
problem episodes was increased from 10 to 20, and reliability was strongly increased. The 




Intercorrelations among the EI criteria scores are given in Table 2. 
                                      
 
 





































































































* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
It is seen that there is no evidence of a strong general dimension of emotion identification 
ability, but some coherence can be detected. 
 
Several standard personality dimensions were also measured, to be used as criteria. 
Eysenck's MPI scales (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985) were used, but the psychoticism scale 
had a too low alfa value to be useful
6. The alfas for neuroticism, extraversion and the lie 
scale were 0.83, 0.86 and 0.77, respectively. A Big Five questionnaire (Wiggins & Trapnell, 
1997) was also used, having 15-20 balanced items in each factor
7. The alfa values were 
0.7 or better.  
 
Hogan's Development Survey (HDS) was used as another benchmark measure (Hogan & 
Hogan, 1997). This fairly new scale is an attempt to measure "the dark side" of personality, 
i.e. a number of negative tendencies such as being skeptical, eccentric or arrogant. It 
consists of 168 items, 14 for each of 11 scales and a 12th scale, also with 14 items, 
measuring social desirability. In the present sample, the alfa values for these scales varied 
between 0.33 (dependent) and 0.69, and most had at least borderline acceptable alfa's.   
 
Response styles. To measure response style and self presentation bias, the Crowne-
Marlowe measure of social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was employed (present 
alfa=0.84), as well as the MPI lie scale (see above). More recently developed scales by 
Paulhus (Paulhus, Bruce, & Trapnell, 1995; Paulhus & Reid, 1991) were also included, 
intended to measure impression management (18 items, alfa=0.83) and self deception (19 
items, alfa=0.76)
8. Both impression management and self deception were treated here as 
response style variables. There was also a social desirability scale included in the HDS 




These scales were included in order to check for impression management, which was 
expected to be present. They were strongly intercorrelated, see Table 3.  
                                                             
         
Table. 3. Intercorrelations among five impression management scores. 
                                   
                             1 2 3 4 5 
1. MPI Lie scale      1.00  0.80**  0.55**  0.75**  0.55** 
2. Impression man.    0.80**  1.00  0.45**  0.77**  0.50** 
3. Self deception     0.55**  0.45**  1.00  0.62**  0.46** 
4. Social des.        0.75**  0.77**  0.62**  1.00  0.64** 
5. HDS soc.des.      0.55**  0.50**  0.46**  0.64**  1.00 
** p<0.01 
 
Critics of the social desirability and impression management scales argue that these may 
well measure some real factor such as adjustment (McCrae & Costa, 1983; Robinson, 
1973). However, the items do measure a not very sophisticated tendency in impression 
management; it is unlikely that those who endorse such items tell the truth because people 
simply are not that well adjusted. Or they may in fact see themselves in such a light and 
that would not seem to be a sign of good adjustment but the opposite. Yet, the present 
study included a section of active faking in order to validate the impression management 
scales.  
 
Procedure. The participants went through the various tasks in the following order: 
 
z Mood ratings 
z Identifying emotions in music, art, social episodes and facial expressions 
z Hogan's Development Survey 




Main personality questionnaire structure. The 41 indices described above were subjected 
to factor analysis, which could be regarded as a second-order factor analysis. Direct oblimin 
rotation was used, and rotated factors were quite independent. Four broad factors were 
obtained, see Table 4. They explained 58.1 % of the total variance, and there was no 
indication of a meaningful fifth factor. The pattern ("loading") matrix of Table 4 shows quite 
clearly that the factors were distinctly defined. They were interpreted as follows: 
 
Factor 1: Mental instability 
Factor 2: Inhibition, rigidity, perfectionism 
Factor 3: Emotional intelligence (EI)  
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Factor 4: Dominance and energy, including creativity 
                   
 
Table. 4. Factor pattern, four secondary factors. Coefficients smaller than an absolute value of 0.3 have 
been deleted. 
  Factor  1  Factor  2  Factor  3  Factor  4 
Neuroticism              0.83       
Lability                  0.81       
Manifest anxiety          0.80       
Worry                     0.75       
Rehearsal                 0.74       
Enigma                    0.65       
Cognitive interf.                   0.61  -0.57     
Control                                                         -0.61      0.31 
Perfectionism             0.53  0.36  -0.33   
Self actualization       -0.53    0.35   
Problem avoidance         0.53       
Decision stress           0.51       
External attribution      0.50       
Decision avoidance                                      0.46      -0.31 
Impulsiveness            -0.45  0.30    0.34 
Lack of control           0.39      -0.37 
Demand for approval       0.33       
Luck attribution          0.31       
        
Inhibition                                 0.75     
Compulsiveness            0.40  0.71     
Benign control                             0.65    -0.38 
Decision perfectionism                     0.54     
Rigidity                                   0.48     
Procrastination           0.45  -0.46     
        
Empathy                                                     0.84   
Introversion                                               -0.76   
Emotional inhibition                                       -0.70   
Machiavellianism                                           -0.61   
Alexithymia               0.42  -0.31  -0.46   
        
Creativity                                                  0.32  0.67 
Self esteem                                                        0.62 
Dominance                                                   -0.32      0.62 
Schutte et al. EQ                                           0.42  0.57 
Sensation seeking                                              0.57 
Extraversion                                                0.30  0.55 
Competence attribution                     0.34    0.50 
Need for cognition                                              -0.49 
Energy                                                                0.47 
Faith in intuition                                                  0.42 





It is notable that compulsiveness, procrastination and perfectionism were included both in 
mental instability and rigidity/perfectionism factors. It is also interesting to note that 
creativity was included in the factor of dominance/energy, which was independent of the 
other secondary factors. EI seemed to be measured best by a high value in empathy, and 
low values in emotional inhibition, being socially withdrawn and cynicism. The Schutte et al. 
measure of EI was loaded in the present EI factor and on energy/dominance, a finding 
similar to the previous study (Sjöberg, 2001b), and discussed there. Briefly, a closer 
scrutiny of the items used in the Schutte scale shows most of them to reflect self-efficacy in 
social and emotional dimensions; this is probably the reason why it correlated with scales 
measuring confidence, energy and dominance, in addition to EI. Petrides and Furnham 
(Petrides & Furnham, 2000) furthermore found the Schutte scale not to be unifactorial, and 
so did Sjöberg (Sjöberg, 2001b) 
 
It may seem strange that "emotional irresponsibility" had a positive loading in EI, but 
scrutiny of these items from the original "Irrational beliefs" inventory (Koopman et al., 
1994) showed that they sample beliefs that say that emotions are not fully under one's 
control. It can be debated if this is really an "irrational" type of belief.  
 
The defining indices were standardized and combined, and over-all scores in the four 
factors were calculated for each participant. The distributions of these scores were 
reasonably normal-looking.  
 
Relations between secondary factors and standard benchmark tests 
 
It is important to investigate if any personality scales really only are variations on the 
FFM theme. The factors were therefore correlated with the three sets of personality 
variables included in our design, i.e. the Big Five, the MPI dimensions (except 
psychoticism, see methods section), and the HDS scales. The results are given in 
Tables 5 and 6.                                                                                                    
 
Table 5. Correlations between secondary factors and FFM and MPI scales. 
                            F1 
 
F2 F3 F4 
Agreeableness (FFM)            -0.30**  0.13  0.48**  -0.03 
Conscientiousness (FFM)        -0.25**  0.48**  0.06  0.11 
Emotional stability (FFM)      -0.73**  0.30**  0.25**  0.60** 
Extraversion (FFM)             -0.60**  0.21**  0.57**  0.54** 
Intellect/autonomy (FFM)       -0.67**  0.28**  0.38**  0.65** 
MPI Extraversion               -0.51**  0.17*  0.48**  0.58** 
MPI Neuroticism                 0.86**  -0.21**  -0.37**  -0.42** 
 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 6. Correlations between HDS scales and secondary factors 
 F1 
 
F2 F3 F4 
Arrogant          -0.02  0.39**  -0.18*  0.45** 
Passively      
Aggressive         0.38**  0.04  -0.41**  -0.00 
Dramatic          -0.28**  0.22**  0.22**  0.39** 
Cautious           0.65**  -0.07  -0.31**  -0.36** 
Volatile           0.45**  -0.17*  -0.13  -0.21** 
Dependent          0.28**  -0.03  -0.05  -0.29** 
Detached           0.33**  0.02  -0.42**  -0.28** 
Perfectionistic    0.10  0.52**  -0.02  0.16* 
Mistrustful        0.18*  0.27**  -0.27**  0.15* 
Manipulative      -0.17*  0.08  -0.10  0.43** 
Eccentric         -0.10  0.04  0.08  0.32** 
Social desirability          -0.35**  0.27**  0.07  0.33** 
Total score      0.27**  0.36**  -0.31**  0.27** 
                                                                               
    * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
  
                                 
It is seen in Table 5 that EI correlated substantially with the Big Five dimensions, and 
that the other secondary factors also correlated with most of them. The MPI scales were 
also, in some cases, highly correlated with the secondary factors. The relationships 
were weaker with the HDS scales, but in the expected directions for the most parts. It is 
interesting to see that EI correlated negatively with the total HDS score, as it should, 
and that energy/dominance correlated positively, in spite of the latter being on the whole 
a positive aspect of personality (at least in the present context).  
 
It is noteworthy that all of the Big Five dimensions except conscientiousness were 
related to EI, not only intellectual openness. Extraversion was most strongly related to 
EI, as expected (Ciarrochi et al., 2000), but almost as strongly also to other secondary 
factors.  
 
The results of multiple regression analyses are presented in Table 7, where the 
secondary factor scores are related to the FFM scales. 
                                 





Table 7. Regression analyses with secondary factors as dependent variables, FFM scales as 
LQGHSHQGHQW￿ ￿ ZHLJKWV DQG 5
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   * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
The results show that relatively little variance (except error) beyond the FFM is 
contained in 3 of the 4 factor scores, the exception being perfectionism/rigidity. EI as 
defined here is thus largely explained by FFM factors. As will be seen later, however, 
there were some indications that EI still measures some important aspects of emotional 
skills beyond the information contained by FFM factors.  
 
These analyses show that the factors were strongly and systematically related to the 
FFM factors Extraversion and Neuroticism, and also to some of the HDS scales. If this 
is good or bad can be debated. The fairly strong relationships mean that much of the 
variance in the factors can be accounted for by the standard scales. On the other hand, 
this also means that the secondary factors measure well established personality 
dimensions. The question remains if they are more valid than the standard scales in 
differentiating emotion skills (and other relevant skills in e.g. business) and if they are 
more or less affected by response styles. The latter is a particularly important issue in a 
competitive testing situation. Emotion skills will next be analyzed and then the matter of 
response style. 
 
Emotion skills. The secondary factors were related to the measures of emotional skills: 
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Table. 8. Correlations between emotion skills scores and secondary factors. 
                         
        
F1 F2  F3  F4 
Facial expr.    -0.21**  -0.01  0.15*  0.02 
Art              0.12  -0.20**  -0.07  -0.20** 
Episodes        -0.06  -0.04  0.07  0.00 
Music           -0.04  -0.07  0.12  -0.05 
Habitual mood    0.33**  -0.04  -0.25**  -0.19** 
Current mood     0.18*  -0.04  -0.21**  -0.02 
       * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
 
The results were partly encouraging. Facial expressions and mood knowledge scores 
were related to EI as expected while music, art and episodes were not. It is also 
interesting that emotional stability was related to the same emotion skills scores.  
 
The other personality dimensions measured here were also related to the emotion skills 
variables. No consistent or otherwise strong relationships were found with emotion 
identification skills. As to emotion knowledge, these two variables correlated with FFM 
and MPI variables at the same level as with the secondary factors, while emotion 
knowledge variables were virtually unrelated to the HDS scales.  
 
The three sets of explanatory variables were next related to mood knowledge scores 
using multiple regression. The amount of variance accounted for is given in Table 9. 
                                    
 
 
Table 9. Amount av variance accounted for in regression models with judgments of current and 



























It is seen that the FFM scales did worse than both the secondary factors and the MPI 
factors and that the secondary factors were somewhat better than the MPI factors in 




Mayer et al. have emphasized empathy among all the possible EI dimensions and found 
significant correlations with their measures of emotional abilities. In the present data, 
empathy did not correlate significantly with any with emotion skills measures.  
To determine if the secondary factors contributed anything beyond the standard scales, 
the following procedure was used with the two measures of emotion knowledge as 
dependent variables. The two MPI scales and EI were entered in the regression models 
for current and habitual mood knowledge. In both cases both EI and neuroticism 
obtained significant beta weights. It was thus established in these data that EI did yield 
information not contained in standard MPI scales. The five FFM scales were next 
entered in analogous analyses, together with the EI scale. The latter obtained the 
largest beta weight, statistically significant, in both cases. Hence, EI seemed to offer 
something beyond the FFM dimensions in understanding emotion knowledge.  
 
Gender and age. Age correlated -0.12, -0.27 (p<0.01), -0.01 and -0.09 with the four 
secondary factors in the order emotional stability, rigidity, EI and dominance. Hence, the 
older participants showed a somewhat higher level of mental adjustment, but no higher 
EI per se.  
 
The gender differences were significant, according to t tests, in two cases: 
rigidity/perfectionism and EI (men scoring lower in both cases). The females thus did 
show the expected advantage in EI (Ciarrochi et al., 2000) and the difference was fairly 
large (0.39 in terms of standardized scores). Part of these differences may be due to 
different levels of impression management (pooled score) of the two genders. Women 
were on the average 0.32 standardized units higher than the men in this respect, 
p=0.025. Holding impression management (pooled score) constant, the EI gender 
difference was still present but the difference in Factor 2 disappeared. Thus, male 
participants did not have any advantage and the female lead seemed to reflect a true 
and large difference in EI. 
 
 
Validation of impression management scales 
 
The final part of the questionnaire called for judgments intended to maximize the 
chance of being admitted, i.e. purely tactical. Four scales were used in that section: 
general self esteem, manifest anxiety, impulsive decision making and sensation 
seeking. The alfa's for these faking scales were 0.68, 0.44, 0.43 and 0.71, respectively. 
Note the low values in two cases, much lower than the corresponding values in the 
primary part of the questionnaire. There is an indication here of complex response sets. 
 
The means of the faking scales were compared to the means of the corresponding 





























































                                     
In three cases there were clearly significant differences between primary and faking 
sections, and the correlations were moderate to low. The participants were on the 
average indicating that they believed that less manifest anxiety and impulsivity would be 
desirable, and more self esteem. They were divided with regard to sensation seeking. 
 
Difference scores were then formed by taking the difference between the faked and the 
primary scores, correlations are found in Table 11.  
                                         
 










Impulsivity    1.00  -0.40**  0.46**  -0.29** 
Self esteem          -0.40**  1.00  -0.40**  0.36** 
Man.anxiety          0.46**  -0.40**  1.00  -0.25** 
Sensation  seeking   -0.29**  0.36**  -0.25**  1.00 
  ** p<0.01 
                     
 
The data support the notion of a general faking strategy revealed in these difference 
scores. The four difference scores were pooled to a composite measure of faking 
strategy after due reversals of two scores. The idea behind this index construction was 
to get another index measuring faked responses in the questionnaire, based on very 
different data and logic as compared to the traditional impression management scales. 
If the primary scores are close to the faked scores there is an indication that also the  
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primary scores were to some extent faked. This new index correlated 0.28 (p <0.05) 
with impression management. 
Faking strategy was related to the secondary factor scores together with the pooled 




Table 12. Results of multiple regression analyses of the 4 secondary factor scores and final pooled 




￿￿ ,PSUHVVLRQ PDQDJHPHQW 
 













































   * p<0.05, *** p<0.001 
                                     
 
The mean proportion of variance accounted for in the four factors scores was 0.303. 
The faking strategy measure was on the whole a better predictor of the factor scores 
than the impression management measure, but somewhat worse for the pooled score. It 
is important to note that factors 1 and 4 were very strongly related to the strategic 
behavior of the participants, as measured here, while factors 2 and 3 were much less 
correlated with strategic behavior. Especially EI was hardly at all affected by strategic 
behavior of the participants.  
 
How much were the FFM factors affected by faking? Much the same as the secondary 
factors, the average share of variance accounted for being 0.283 The faking strategy 
variable was the most powerful predictor in 2 of the 5 cases.  It can be concluded that 
some 30% of the variance could be accounted for by impression management and 
faking strategies. 
 
In practice, the impression management strategies can be counteracted to some extent 
by statistical control using the two variables of impression management and faking 
strategy. To demonstrate this strategy and its consequences, a pooled score of the four 
secondary factors was used as the dependent variable. The residuals, after controlling 
for impression management and faking strategy, correlated 0.69 with the original pooled 
score of the factors. In more concrete terms, of the 30 highest scores according to the 
residuals, only 9 also scored among the highest 30 according to the original scores. 
That is, two thirds of the high-scoring testees were detected as possible fakers and 
deleted from the "short list". Another cutoff (the one actually used) would be 60. The 60 
scoring highest on the residual dimension contained 37 participants who also belonged  
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to the 60 highest scorers on the pooled raw score dimension. Hence, about 38% of the 
initial top scorers were deleted from this longer short list. Some dramatic individual 
changes were noted. The person ranking 13 in uncorrected final score dropped to 
position 160 in the residual score. The 2nd top residual score corresponded to rank 96 
in raw score. These extreme cases were somewhat exceptional and the rank order 
correlation between the two measures was substantial, but they still illustrate the 




To recapitulate, the purpose of the present paper was to investigate whether 
 
·  an EI dimension can be isolated from other, standard, personality dimensions and 
whether it is related to gender (women expected to be superior) but not to age 
 
·  if trait EI is related to emotion identification skills and contributes to explaining such 
skills beyond the standard FFM dimensions 
 
·  if EI can be measured in a highly competitive selection situation without being 
unduly influenced by impression management tendencies, or if such a tendency 
could be counteracted by statistical control 
 
Summing up, it was found that EI could be isolated and measured, that it was related to 
gender as expected but not to age, that it was correlated with some, but not all, emotion 
related skills beyond what could be measured with standard benchmark tests and that 
there were indications that it could be measured independently of impression 
management in a high-stakes selection situation.  
 
It should be noted that most published work on EI has been carried out in non-applied 
settings, where the scores have not had any important consequences to the 
participants. In the present study, the opposite was true. The situation was one of highly 
competitive testing where scores meant a lot to the participants. It is probably such a 
situation where EI measurement is contemplated by many practitioners, but it is hard to 
investigate because of access problems.  
 
As to the emotion skills measures, devised partly according to the ideas of Mayer, 
Salovey and Caruso, it was found that the identification scores worked best for facial 
expressions. This may be because such scores are most clearly related to emotional 
functioning while the ability to give modal responses to judgments about art and music 
may be less relevant. Social problem episodes, described in vignettes, seemed to be a 
mixed case of some relevance. In a separate validation study, they have turned out to 
be quite promising (Sjöberg, 2001a). The MEIS instrument contains also several other, 
more complex, types of emotion skills measures, based on judgments of verbally 
presented information. Some previous research has shown, however, that the  
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identification dimensions work best (Ciarrochi et al., 2000) and it seemed unlikely that 
the more complex dimensions would be more useful in the present context.  
Most relevant, however, were the scores of mood and emotion knowledge described 
here and in a previous paper (Sjöberg, 2001b). The existence of an ability to make 
judgments about how other people feel currently or habitually is likely on the basis of the 
present and previous findings. The scores were also related to EI as measured by 
questionnaire items. 
 
The four secondary factors obtained in the analysis of questionnaire items replicated 
well those found in the previous study, with the possible exception that Factor 2 was 
more of a measure of inhibition/rigidity than pure compulsory tendencies. The main 
properties of the factors remained. Factor 1 was clearly a factor of emotional stability 
and Factor 3 one of EI. Factor 4 was a factor of mental energy and creativity. It was 
interesting to see that sensation seeking was included in this factor. 
The secondary factors were related to FFM scales and it was found that the latter 
accounted for a large portion of their variance. Yet, there were some findings suggesting 
that the secondary factors offered at least some information in addition to the FFM 
scales. This was true of EI more than the more traditional dimensions of emotional 
stability and energy. It should also be noted that the FFM scales were quite fakeable.  
 
The measurement of these personality dimensions in a high-stakes competitive 
situation is by no means easy. Faking is an ever-present possibility, even if the literature 
on this point is encouraging. Faking has been a current concern in research on 
personality measurement (Visveswaran & Ones, 1999). Research on the issue has 
supported an optimistic conclusion: the effects on validity are small even in a selection 
situation. Extensive research on the question has shown that social desirability does not 
appear to influence scores to the extent of jeopardizing their validity (Barrick & Mount, 
1996; Borman, Hanson, & Hedge, 1997; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996), and that 
faking more generally seems to be a somewhat marginal problem (Cunningham, Wong, 
& Barbee, 1994), as does coaching on similar and related tests (Palmer & Busciglio, 
1996). Yet, in selection situations with a small selection ratio, there may be great 
changes in who is selected, depending on whether there is a correction for impression 
management or not, as demonstrated in the present data. If validity is not affected by 
such rank order changes it must be the case that raw scores and corrected scores carry 
unique, but different, validity creating components.  
 
The present study used 4 different scales of impression management and they agreed 
quite well, and also with a fifth scale of social desirability used by the Hogan 
Development Survey. A pooled measure of these scales was used for further analysis of 
the importance of impression management. In addition, a section of the questionnaire 
(the last one) called for active faking, and gave some information which was used, with 




Much of the work on faking seems to have used non-consequential testing situations. A 
scale of faking strategy was constructed here on the basis of the responses to the 
instructions to fake actively, and it was found to give important information in addition to 
the regular impression management scales. This measure of faking can be seen as a 
measure of specific faking, being tied to the specified dimensions rather than being 
general in nature as the usual measures of impression management. Specific measures 
in general are usually more strongly correlated with dimensions matched in content than 
the more general dimensions e.g. measuring personality, and it was found also in the 
present case that such tended to be the case. General impression management and 
specific faking together provided a quite powerful source of control of the final score. 
Such control is highly desirable in a testing situation such as the present one where 
many participants can be expected to behave in a tactical manner when answering the 
questions. In individual cases, the control measures taken produced dramatic changes 
in the rank order positions of the participants.  
 
EI was much less affected by impression management and faking than other secondary 
factors. It may therefore be a good idea to extend faking to include central aspects of all 
4 secondary factors and to use the measure of faking strategy, together with a pooled 
impression management score, to correct factor scores statistically. In such a way, more 
valid factor scores can be devised and later used for personnel decisions. So far, EI 
appears to be less fakeable than the more traditional personality scales measuring 
emotional adjustment and energy/dominance. 
 
Finally, it is pertinent to ask how EI should be measured. None of the two approaches 
described in the literature has received a full-scale predictive validation in an industrial 
setting, at least no such validation has been published. Neither have they been 
extensively compared to each other, to standard benchmark tests or analyzed with 
regard to impression management. Little work is available where these measures have 
been applied in high-stakes applied settings. The answer to the question how to 
measure EI in such a setting is therefore necessarily quite preliminary. However, the 
present paper and previous work (Sjöberg, 2001b) suggest that the personality trait 
approach may be promising. The skills approach seems to be hard to use because 
consensual scoring sometimes leads to low reliabilities (some exceptions exist to this 
statement) and, more important, because the contents of the objects used (music, art, 
episodes or facial expressions) leads to measures which do not clearly converge on a 
general dimension of emotional skill. It is true that some promising results have been 
published on the skills approach, but they have not been widely replicated. 
 
In a recent study, with the purpose of validating EI dimension, it was found that it 
correlated substantially with some criteria, such as life/work balance and salary, and 
that the gender difference was quite substantial, in favor of the female participants 




The standard objection to personality trait measures is that they can be faked. While 
this is true, such faking was not strong for all dimensions studied here (consider the 
positive EI findings) and can possibly be largely controlled by means of measures of 
impression management and faking strategies as demonstrated in the present paper. 
Further work in the direction of personality traits and faking control may therefore be the 
most promising approach. One problem to investigate is what are the prevailing 
stereotypes about how one should present oneself in order to succeed in the test. The 
items conveyed a message about what the tester had in mind, but they did so in great 
abundance (over 1000 items in the present study) and some dimensions may have 
been more obvious than others. Besides, even if a dimension or concept is more or less  
obvious to the testees, they may not agree on what is going to be scored as positive. An 
example in the present test is that of sensation seeking. About half of the testees 
indicated that a high level in that dimension was desirable, but half had the opposite 
opinion. EI was probably, in the present testing session, not very much faked by the 
testees. One wonders why. It is unlikely that the dimension per se is hard to fake or 
does not invite faking. Possibly, the concept was not very salient in a context dominated 
by items measuring either emotional adjustment or dominance/energy. An anti-faking 
strategy would then be to conceal crucial concepts by means of a context suggesting 




  References 
 
Bagby, R. M., Parker, J. D., & Taylor, G. J. (1994). The twenty item Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale -I. Item selection and cross-validation of the factor structure. Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research, 38, 23-32. 
Bar-On, R. (1997). The emotional quotient inventory (EQ-i): Technical manual. Toronto: 
Multi-Health Systems. 
Bar-On, R. (2000). Emotional and social intelligence: Insights from the Emotional 
Quotient Inventory. In R. Bar-On & J. D. A. Parker (Eds.), The handbook of 
emotional intelligence (pp. 363-388). San Francisco, CAn: Jossey-Bass. 
Bar-On, R., Brown, J. M., Kirkcaldy, B. D., & Thomé, E. P. (2000). Emotional expression 
and implications for occupational stress; an application of the Emotional Quotient 
Inventory (EQ-i). Personality and Individual Differences, 28, 1107-1118. 
Bar-On, R., & Parker, J. D. A. (Eds.). (2000). The handbook of emotional intelligence. 
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Barrick, M. R., & Mount, M. K. (1996). Effects of impression management and self-
deception on the predictive validity of personality constructs. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 81, 261-272. 
Borman, W. C., Hanson, M. A., & Hedge, J. W. (1997). Personnel selection. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 48, 299-337. 
Broadbent, D. E., Cooper, P. F., Fitzgerald, P., & Parkes, K. R. (1982). The Cognitive 
Failures Questionnaire and its correlates. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 
21, 1-16. 
Christie, R., & Geis, F. L. (1970). Studies in Machiavellianism. New York: Academic 
Press. 
Ciarrochi, J. V., Chan, A. Y. C., & Caputi, P. (2000). A critical evaluation of the 
emotional intelligence construct. Personality and Individual Differences, 28, 539-
561. 
Claes, L., Vertommen, H., & Braspenning, N. (2000). Psychometric properties of the 
Dickman impulsivity inventory. Personality and Individual Differences, 29, 27-35. 
Collins, B. E. (1974). Four components of the Rotter Internal-External scales: Belief in a 
difficult world, a just world, a predictable world, and a politically responsive world. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29, 381-391. 
Cronbach, L. J. (1951). Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests. 
Psychometrika, 16, 297-334. 
Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of 
psychopathology. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 24, 349-354. 
Cunningham, M. R., Wong, D. T., & Barbee, A. P. (1994). Self-presentation dynamics 
on overt integrity tests: Experimental studies of the Reid Report. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 79, 643-658. 
Davies, M., Stankov, L., & Roberts, R. D. (1998). Emotional intelligence: In search of an 
elusive construct. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 989-1015.  
 
 24 
Engen, T., Levy, N., & Schlosberg, H. (1957). A new series of facial expressions. 
American Psychologist, 12, 264-266. 
Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in 
intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking styles. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 71, 390-405. 
Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, M. W. (1985). Personality and individual differences. New 
York: Plenum Press. 
Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional intelligence. New York: Bantam Books. 
Goleman, D. (1998). Working with emotional intelligence. New York: Bantam Books. 
Hogan, R. (1969). Development of an empathy scale. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 33, 307-316. 
Hogan, R., & Hogan, J. (1997). Hogan Development Survey.: Hogan Assessment 
Systems. 
Jones, A., & Crandall, R. (1986). Validation of a short index of self-actualization. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 12, 63-73. 
Koopman, P. C., Sanderman, R., Timmerman, I., & Emmelkamp, P. M. G. (1994). The 
irrational beliefs inventory (IBI): Development and psychometric evaluation. 
European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 10(1), 15-27. 
Mann, L., Burnett, P., Radford, M., & Ford, S. (1997). The Melbourne Decision Making 
Questionnaire: An instrument for measuring patterns for coping with decisional 
conflict. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 10, 1-19. 
Mayer, J. D., Caruso, D. R., & Salovey, P. (2000). Selecting a measure of emotional 
intelligence: The case for ability scales. In R. Bar-On & J. D. A. Parker (Eds.), 
The handbook of emotional intelligence (pp. 320-342). San Francisco, CAn: 
Jossey-Bass. 
Mayer, J. D., DiPaolo, M. T., & Salovey, P. (1990). Perceiving affective content in 
ambiguous visual stimuli: A component of emotional intelligence. Journal of 
Personality Assessment, 54, 772-781. 
Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. (2000). Competing models of emotional 
intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of human intelligence. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1983). Social desirability scales: More substance than 
style. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 51, 882-888. 
McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T., Jr. (1987). Validation of the five-factor model of 
personality across instruments and observers. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 52, 81-90. 
Mehrabian, A., & Epstein, N. (1970). A measure of emotional empathy. Journal of 
Personality, 40, 525-543. 
Ones, D. S., Viswesvaran, C., & Reiss, A. D. (1996). Role of social desirability in 
personality testing for personnel selection: The red herring. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 81, 660-679. 
Palmer, D. R., & Busciglio, H. H. (1996). Coaching on the ASVAB: Analysis of posttest 
questionnaire responses. Military Psychology, 8, 267-278.  
 
 25 
Paulhus, D. L. (1991). Measurement and control of response bias. In J. P. Robinson & 
P. R. Shaver & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), Measures of personality and social-
psychological attitudes (pp. 17-59). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Paulhus, D. L., Bruce, N. N., & Trapnell, P. D. (1995). Effects of self-presentation 
strategies on personality profiles and their structure. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 21, 100-108. 
Paulhus, D. L., & Reid, D. (1991). Enhancement and denial in socially desirable 
responding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 307-317. 
Petrides, K. V., & Furnham, A. (2000). On the dimensional structure of emotional 
intelligence. Personality and Individual Differences, 29, 313-320. 
Robinson, J. P. (1973). Methodological scales. In J. P. Robinson & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), 
Measures of social psychological attitudes (pp. 723-744). Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan. 
Roger, D., & Najarian, B. (1989). The construction and validation of a new scale for 
measuring emotion control. Personality and Individual Differences, 10, 845-853. 
Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of 
reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 80(609). 
Salovey, P., & Mayer, J. D. (1990). Emotional intelligence. Imagination, Cognition and 
Personality, 9, 185-211. 
Schutte, N. S., Malouff, J. M., Hall, L. E., Haggerty, D. J., Cooper, J. T., Golden, C. J., & 
Dornheim, L. (1998). Development and validation of a measure of emotional 
intelligence. Personality and Individual Differences, 25, 167-177. 
Schwarzer, R. (1993). Measurement of perceived self-efficacy: Psychometric scales for 
cross-cultural research. Berlin: Freien Universität. 
Sjöberg, L. (2001a). Emotional intelligence and life adjustment (SSE/EFI Report). 
Stockholm. 
Sjöberg, L. (2001b). Emotional intelligence: A psychometric analysis. European 
Psychologist, 6(2), 79-95. 
Sjöberg, L., & Lind, F. (1994). Arbetsmotivation i en krisekonomi: En studie av 
prognosfaktorer. (Work motivation in a crisis economy: A study of prognostic 
variables) (Studier i ekonomisk psykologi 121): Institutionen för ekonomisk 
psykologi, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm. 
Sjöberg, L., Svensson, E., & Persson, L.-O. (1979). The measurement of mood. 
Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 20, 1-18. 
Sternberg, R. J., Forsythe, G. B., Hedlund, J., Horvath, J. A., Wagner, R. K., Williams, 
W. M., Snook, S. A., & Grigorenko, E. L. (2000). Practical intelligence in 
everyday life. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Taylor, J. (1953). A personality scale of manifest anxiety. Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, 48, 285-290. 
West, S. G., & Finch, J. F. (1997). Personality measurement. Reliability and validity 
issues. In R. Hogan & J. Johnson & S. Briggs (Eds.), Handbook of personality 
psychology (pp. 143-164). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.  
 
 26 
Wiggins, J. S., & Trapnell, P. D. (1997). Personality structure: The return of the Big Five. 
In R. Hogan & J. Johnson & S. Briggs (Eds.), Handbook of personality 
psychology (pp. 737-766). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Visveswaran, C., & Ones, D. S. (1999). Meta-analysis of fakability estimates: 
Implications for personality measurement. Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 59, 197-210. 
Zuckerman, M. (1994). Behavioral expressions and biosocial bases of sensation 
seeking. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
 
 27 





                         
1. I am grateful to Professor D. L. Paulhus for the SDR scales used here and to Professor 
Hunter Mabon for letting me use the Swedish version of the Hogan Development  Survey. Dr. 
Anders Sjöberg of Psykologiförlaget was also very helpful in connection with the use of that 
scale. Dr. Håkan Källmén provided Swedish versions of the Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale 
and the Manifest Anxiety Scale. Caroline Nordlund, M. A., was very helpful in the 
administration of the tests. Professor Bo Ekehammar gave valuable comments on the 
manuscript.  
2. Emotional intelligence usually refers as much to social as emotional intelligence and the 
concept will be used that way in the present paper, unless otherwise stated. This terminology 
is unfortunate, since the two dimensions are logically distinct and may or may not correlate 
empirically.  
3. Present alpha values are based on the testing reported in the present article, hence in 
many cases on translated scales. Small SD's may account for some of the fairly low 
reliability coefficients noted here. It should also be noted that a four category response 
scale (see text) was used throughout, which in some cases was a divergence from the 
procedures of the original scales. 
4. These scales refer to, respectively, ruminating about troubling events, suppressing 
feelings, lack of negative emotional reactivity, and lack of aggression. 
5. In this and subsequent tables, * means p<0.05, and ** means p<0.01.  
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6. The group consisted of young people with a high level of scholastic achievement and 
possibly did not include the variation in psychoticism to be expected in a sample from the 
general population, or from clinical samples.  
7. Due to a technical mishap one item was missed and one was deleted for other reasons. 
The response scale used four categories, not five as in the standard version. A few items 
were slightly rephrased. 
8.Two items were deleted due to concerns over privacy invasion issues. 